



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search


Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

THE
TIENTSIN MASSACRE






600075866







THE TIENTSIN MASSACRE



THE TIENTSIN MASSACRE

THE CAUSES

OF THE

LATE DISTURBANCES IN CHINA

AND

HOW TO SECURE PERMANENT PEACE

BY

GEORGE THIN, M.D.

VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE NORTH CHINA BRANCH OF THE
ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY



WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS

EDINBURGH AND LONDON

MDCCCLXX

246. g 42.



P R E F A C E.

I REGRET that the circumstances under which this little book has been written, have compelled me to write so briefly of the many important subjects on which it has been necessary to touch. Especially I regret having been able to devote so little space to the consideration of the extension of the sale of English manufactured goods in China, as I find—from a review in ‘Fraser’s Magazine’ of a book entitled ‘Home Politics, or the Growth of Trade considered in Relation to Labour, Pauperism, and Emigration’—that new markets are more imperatively demanded for English

manufactures than I had supposed. If a market more than sufficient to satisfy the present want is not found in China, the English people can only blame their Government, which refuses to give them free access to a population ten times larger than that of Great Britain and Ireland, the exigencies of whose climate (unlike that of Egypt or India, where our trade is already so large for cotton goods) require them to wear as much clothing as we do in England; where there is as yet no machinery to make us fear the competition of native products; where—thanks to the Suez Canal—we can now put down, at a small cost, manufactured cloth within two months after it has left the mill; and where, to pay for our goods, there is an unexhausted and inexhaustible supply of tea, silk, and mineral wealth.

The present crisis gives an opportunity, which may not soon occur again, of opening


up this source of wealth; and in case too much is expected from the co-operation of other European Governments, it is necessary to bear in mind that this great inducement exists for England alone.

While these pages have been passing through the press, there have been telegrams from China; but they show the situation of things to be unchanged. The latest telegram is dated Tientsin, October 3, and announces that ten Mandarins had been transported (that is, sent to another part of China, where they will be made heroes and martyrs of), fifteen ringleaders beheaded, and that a Mission was preparing for Paris. There never was much doubt about the readiness of the Mandarins to behead any number of the mob. It was necessary that some of these poor wretches should be beheaded; but fifteen is quite enough, and I hope foreign Governments will not ask for the death of any more of these ignorant

victims of Mandarin treachery. But a public execution of the guilty Mandarins is indispensable—not for vengeance, but for security. My letters from Shanghai by the last mail continue to express great fear of what may happen in the winter if this retribution is not speedily exacted. There seems no reason yet to hope that they will be given up without a resort to force.

The “Mission to Paris” means a few Chinamen under the escort of one or two highly-paid Europeans, who will do all they can for the Chinese, and be faithful, as Europeans usually are, to those whose salt they eat. If their proposals are made public, and subjected to criticism, and nothing is done precipitately, no harm can come of the Mission.

A writer in the ‘Times,’ over the signature “Alpha”—who betrays his identity by his denunciation of the “aggressiveness” of foreigners and his dislike of French



missionaries, as well as by the necessity he was under to write a second letter to explain his first, which could not have been very clear when it was misunderstood by the editor of the 'Times'—insinuates that the responsibility of the mischievous delay on the part of Mr Wade lies with the Home Government, whose instructions were too clear to be broken through. But who is responsible for the convictions of the Home Government that produced these instructions?—and who recommended Mr Burlingame's mission to Lord Clarendon? "Alpha" should remember that it is there that the responsibility lies, and not with the too trusting Government, which could only believe according to its information.

EDINBURGH, *October 21, 1870.*



THE TIENTSIN MASSACRE.

ON the 21st of June a massacre of foreigners was perpetrated at Tientsin, in the north of China, which, for the barbarities with which it was accompanied, is almost unexampled even in the history of Oriental nations. The particulars of this massacre have appeared more or less fully in newspapers in this country, though many of the details have perhaps wisely been suppressed. It is very important, however, that the exact nature of these atrocities should not be misunderstood, as they show clearly the kind of people with whom we have to take steps to prevent the recurrence of future massacres. If hatred and revenge on the part of the Chinese produce different effects from what the same passions do amongst Western nations, to avoid their effects it may be necessary

to use measures specially applicable to their peculiarities. It is because I find that everywhere in this country Chinese matters are little understood, and that the Chinese people themselves are for the most part known only through the records of the Jesuit priests, who described their first impressions of them many years ago, their descriptions being for the most part applicable to an ideal China, and not to the actual China of the present day, that I feel impelled to draw the attention of the people of this country to the present position of our foreign relations with China. For the last three years men of great experience in that country have believed that the policy that was being pursued by foreign Governments would result in disturbance and war; and the newspapers of the commercial cities where trade is carried on by foreigners have been filled with prophecies of which the Tientsin massacre is a fulfilment. It is impossible now, in the face of this event, to shut our eyes to the fact that these prophecies should not have been neglected; and those who may have taken any interest in the policy of the present Government in regard to China since the arrival of the embassy of the late Mr Burlingame, must now recognise that the solemn warnings that fol-


lowed the embassy from China, urging the Foreign Office to disbelieve in the professions of friendship of which it was the bearer, have been justified by events. I believe that if the people of England knew the history of the difficulties that have occurred in different parts of China since the attack on Mr Taylor's mission at Yangchow, they would unanimously agree with their countrymen in Hong-Kong and Shanghai, that the time has come in which foreigners must establish their position in China on a new basis. It is evident that a system is wrong under which perpetual appeals to force are necessary in order to secure the safety of lives and property, and under which the slaughter of foreigners is always possible by a superstitious mob. Unless it is contemplated to withdraw foreigners from China altogether—a retrograde measure which the civilisation of the century can never contemplate—then it is the duty of the Governments whose subjects reside in China to take such measures as will enable business to be carried on in freedom and safety. That this freedom and safety are easily attainable I firmly believe, and the object I have in writing is to show how, in my opinion, they are to be attained.

To do this I must request attention to the de-

tails of the massacre of Tientsin, and of other events of a similar though less startling kind, in order that it may be seen how these outbreaks in China occur, and consequently what must be the nature of preventive measures.

To sum up briefly the circumstances connected with the Tientsin massacre, the events followed in something like this order :—

In the month of June last a popular rumour was raised in several widely distant cities in China that foreign missionaries, and particularly the Catholics, paid unprincipled men to kidnap children. Where these rumours were discountenanced by the authorities they speedily subsided ; but in some places the authorities, instead of discountenancing the reports, took measures that confirmed the belief of the populace. This was the case at Tientsin. It is impossible to know whether the city magistrate believed the reports or not, but it would have been easy for him to make such an examination of the facts as would have shown them to be untrue. Instead of doing this, he published a proclamation that induced the people to believe that the reports were true. There had been for some time a conspiracy against foreigners fomenting in Tientsin, and when this scandalous



story was spread the popular feeling became very much excited. Shopkeepers removed from the neighbourhood of the mission premises, and more than half the children who were being educated by the Catholic Sisters were taken away by their parents. The English consul at Tientsin, wisely inferring that the city magistrate's proclamation would produce disturbance, wrote to a mandarin high in authority at Tientsin, a distinguished officer of the Pekin Government, named Chung How, pointing out the dangers to which the foreign community were exposed, and asking him to take means to calm the popular mind. Mr Lay, the consul, wrote on the 18th June, but received no answer, and again wrote pressingly on the 20th. Again receiving no answer, he wrote a third time, on the 21st, with a like result. Chung How not only did not answer the letters, but took no measures to prevent the outbreak. It is evident, then, that both foreigners and Chinese expected an attack, and that Chung How, the trusted servant of the Pekin Government, looked calmly on at the preparations that were being made, and refused to stir a finger to prevent the murders. That he had power to prevent them I will show in the sequel. This was

the position of affairs on the morning of the 21st June.

The English settlement is two miles distant from the native city of Tientsin. The residents there about 2 P.M. saw that there was a fire in the city, and soon afterwards they learned that the French cathedral, the French consulate, and the premises of the Sisters of Mercy, were in flames, and that the French had been murdered. The tragedy had been played out in a very brief space of time. When the French consulate had been attacked, the consul, M. Fontanier, had sent an officer to Chung How's residence to demand protection. The officer not returning, he took a revolver, and went himself to see Chung How. He had an angry altercation with the mandarin, and was attacked and killed by the populace in the street after leaving the residence. M. Coutris, another Frenchman, took refuge in Chung How's house; and although he was beaten and ill-treated by the officers, his life was spared.


When the French consul was murdered the gongs of the fire-brigade were sounded, and the members of the fire-guilds began to execute their previously-concerted work of destruction and slaughter. M. and Mme. Momassin, guests of the

French consul, on their way to Peking, were killed with swords and spears. Madame de Chalmaisin escaped on horseback, but her husband was caught and cruelly hacked to death. In the evening Madame de Chalmaisin returned to her house in Chinese dress to try and discover what had become of her husband; but having, unfortunately, forgotten to change her European boots, she was detected and cut down with many sword-cuts. On the other side of the river, Mr and Mrs Protopopoff and Mr Basoff, Russians, were making their way to the foreign settlement to escape the murderers, but did not succeed. They were all killed. Mr and Mrs Protopopoff were married two days, and the lady was only sixteen years of age. When found, her body was literally covered with sword-cuts and spear-wounds. At the residence of the Sisters the murders were conducted with a calm atrocity that is never found amongst the lowest savages. The crowd first made a complete inspection of the premises in order to discover some traces of the diabolical practices alleged against them in regard to children's bodies. Of course no such traces were found. They then demanded to be shown the sister-superior. She came forward and said, "You wish to kill the

Europeans ; there are ten of us : my companions are in the chapel, ready, like me, for the sacrifice. Come, then, but spare the Chinese who surround us." Before the others she was stripped and made to undergo a combination of torture, mental and physical, that will not bear description in this country, and was finally killed by being impaled on a spear. The same process was undergone by the others one by one. Their bodies were so mangled that they were unrecognisable.

Having made thorough work of their victims on the city side, the cry was raised to kill the foreigners in the settlement ; but they were checked by the mandarins, who told them their quarrel was only with the French, and the fire-brigade retired at the sound of their gong.

There was then an end for the present of the massacre of foreigners. For days following there was much alarm, and great differences of opinion were expressed as to the meaning of the outbreak. A gentleman at Tientsin, who is consul for several treaty Powers and is a paid servant of Chung How, has made himself unpopular for the rest of his life that he may spend in China by a series of misrepresentations in the newspapers, which have since been completely refuted, whose object was



to insinuate that the Sisters were to blame for bringing their destruction on themselves. The British *chargé-d'affaires* at Pekin, a gentleman well known for his profound Chinese scholarship, and much respected for the honesty and uprightness of his character, is also believed to have taken an exceptional view of the causes of the massacre, maintaining that it was a local outbreak against a few individual Frenchmen, connected with causes for which the French were more or less responsible, and that there was no cause for alarm on the part of other nationalities. It has been supposed that he has instructed the British Government accordingly. Strong views, on this account, have been expressed regarding the attitude of Mr Wade in China; and as the view taken by him may alter the whole of our future history in China, it is obviously of great importance to know what his opinions are. It is to be regretted, therefore, that after the massacre occurred, and while the residents at the ports were alarmed for their lives, he gave no public expression of his opinions either as to the cause of the disturbance or as to the course they should pursue. Of his views and action in China at the present crisis I have no knowledge excepting

what I have gathered from the newspapers; but as he holds, as the adviser of the British Government, a most important position in China, it is only right that the views held in China regarding his conduct of affairs be to a certain extent represented at home. I quote, therefore, the following from a Shanghai newspaper:—

“No one has ever dreamed of charging Mr Wade with anything that is not upright, honourable, and humane. But that does not alter the fact that he is not the least active, though the most disinterested, member of that party whose representations in Europe have contributed powerfully to the circumstances which have led up to the Tientsin massacre. This is no afterthought; for it has been often foretold in our own columns and elsewhere during the last two years that the policy with which Mr Wade had identified himself could lead to nothing else but some signal tragedy. It was always assumed, however, that when the catastrophe did come it would open the eyes of those blind guides who could not see to what tragic conclusions they were driving their ignorant Governments. When Mr Wade came out last year to take the reins at Peking, it was commonly remarked, as a kind of melancholy

consolation, that affairs would soon be brought to such a pass as would demonstrate, even to himself, the utter wrongness of his policy, and that then a wholesome reaction would set in. No one at that time conceived even the possibility of *such* a tragedy as has actually occurred. Yet though the catastrophe has been great, the expected reaction has not taken place. Mr Wade has shown himself as blind to his duty after the massacre as he was before it. He has treated the event with a degree of nonchalance which is simply shocking; he has taken no pains either to see justice done or to inform himself of the facts.

“To say such remarks are offensive to Mr Wade, to say they are in bad taste, is to trifle with by far the most serious event that has ever happened in China. The labours of Mr Wade for some years past have been exactly of the sort to produce a Tientsin massacre as their natural fruit. His behaviour since that terrible event is exactly calculated to produce a succession of similar massacres. We are like passengers in a ship which we see being piloted towards rocks and quicksands—our lives and prospects in imminent peril. The pilot may be drunk or asleep, or he may be addicted to a peculiar use of the mariner’s com-

pass, or he may act on peculiar views of his own of the figure of the earth. It is all the same to us, who see with fear and trembling the dire disaster into which we are being conducted. To interpose feeble counsels about good taste on such an occasion is mere child's play, and betrays an incapacity even to conceive the gravity of the situation. We cannot be expected to wait in silence and resignation for the possible exculpation of our pilot which may follow an inquiry after the wreck, and we cannot be expected to regulate our criticisms by the mild canons of parlour etiquette. It is a matter of life and death to us, and we do not hesitate to repeat that the inaction of the British *chargé-d'affaires* since the 21st of June, to say nothing of the sinister influence of his counsels, is eminently calculated to cause the murder of foreigners all over China, and to retard the progress of civilisation."

By the latest advices from China I see that it is believed there by some that Mr Wade has considerably modified his first opinions regarding the massacre, and in a private letter I am told that it is supposed that he now thinks about it very much as other people do. Readers in this country will be astonished to find people in China attach so much

importance to the thoughts of any one man, but they will understand it when they are told that upon the advice he gives his Government might depend the safety of their lives, or the abandonment of their property and flight on shipboard. On the other hand, holding diametrically opposite views to those that were attributed to Mr Wade is almost without exception the whole English population of China. And as these men claim to be heard on this matter, and will have a grievous wrong done to them if their opinions are disregarded, it is quite to my purpose that I should state of whom this population is composed. It is a very remarkable thing that there should be a unanimous opinion amongst the merchants, missionaries, doctors, and lawyers, at Shanghai and Hong-Kong, that the present threatening attitude of the Chinese towards foreigners is simply the result of foreign Governments having tolerated a series of insults and contemptuous defiance of the treaty of Tientsin. At present I will not stop to prove this, as it will come out in what follows; but what cannot be too strongly stated is, that the policy of Sir Rutherford Alcock, and latterly of Mr Wade, has been considered by the many intelligent observers in China to be productive of

future danger, and that the opinions attributed to Mr Wade regarding the present crisis threaten the safety of their future residence in China. These men have no other community of feeling than the simple desire that we should have a permanent peace with the Chinese. To the merchant peace is necessary to his existence. His purpose in China being to exchange manufactured goods for tea and silk, war is to him a direct loss of market; by the diminution it causes to his trade. To the missionary peace is still more necessary, because his freedom to preach the Gospel depends on it; and carrying his life in his hand, he has the most direct interest in the people of China entertaining friendly feelings towards the persons of foreigners. Professional men have not so direct an interest in China, as their occupations are almost entirely amongst foreigners; but they are qualified, from their education and training, to form sound opinions regarding events that take place under their own eyes. Amongst the merchants and missionaries are men who have spent very many years in China, have travelled amongst the people, know their language and literature, and whose names are not unknown in Europe as being authorities on all matters connected with China. These men,


therefore, have a right to be heard, as well on account of their knowledge as on account of the interest they have at stake requiring a permanent peace. All of them, perhaps without exception, declare that the joint policy of the three leading foreign ambassadors is largely responsible for the present danger; that any view of the present question that regards it as merely a local outbreak will imperil the future; and they implore the British Government not to believe in the soundness of the views attributed to its representative at Peking, if they are found to be at variance with those entertained by every intelligent man on the spot. It is nothing new that a man in power should have his opponents, but it is surely something extraordinary if a gentleman personally so esteemed as Mr Wade is left entirely without support by his fellow-residents in a crisis that threatens such a great evil as a war with China.

I wish to urge on the English people and Government the views regarding China and the present outbreak that are held by nearly all the travellers and thinking men who reside in that country. But in order that I should be understood it is necessary that I should give a pre-

liminary sketch of some of the peculiarities of the Chinese people. The subject is a very wide one, but I will confine myself to a few of the salient points that are necessary to be known in order to form an opinion of any kind regarding the best mode of dealing with the Chinese.

There are three classes in China of whom it is necessary that something should be known before any discussion of this kind can be understood—the people, the mandarins, and the ruling Tartar family. It is necessary that I should say a few words about each.

The Chinese people may number not more than two hundred millions, or may reach upwards of four hundred millions. The exact population it is impossible to approximate. We know that the province of Kiangsu is supposed to have lost upwards of twenty millions of inhabitants by death produced by the Taiping rebellion. The whole empire is supposed by the present Government to have lost upwards of fifty millions by this rebellion. It is undoubted that the population is not only enormous, but that the country, if properly governed, could maintain a much larger population. I have travelled over scores of miles of uncultivated ground within a short distance of where



there was a large population of half-starving people. The Chinese are, as is well known, industrious, sober, and enterprising. They are excellent merchants. There is a negative quality for which they are very remarkable, and that is their ignorance. Absolute ignorance of everything that takes place beyond their immediate place of residence is the condition of the whole population of China. They are ignorant of the events that happen in other parts of the empire, or even in other parts of their own province. For their instruction as to passing events their use of letters is of no assistance. There is not a newspaper in the empire (the 'Pekin Gazette' is not a newspaper, but a catalogue of appointments). The birth or death of an emperor, or a great rebellion, is almost the only kind of information that would spread over the country. Pestilence or famine or floods destroy several millions of people, and nothing is known of it very far from where they happen. They get so little intelligence that when it does reach them they cannot weigh it. Hence the words "the rebels are coming" will make half a province leave their homes panic-stricken; or a goblin story will frighten a hundred thousand people out of their

wits. Instances of both these panics have occurred lately without foundation for them.

The Chinese people are not only ignorant, but they are very superstitious. They believe themselves surrounded with spiritual beings of evil disposition, whose designs it is necessary to frustrate. The belief in ghosts is a living reality to them. I once heard a woman who was sitting beside her grandfather's grave abuse his spirit in a loud voice because she had had a basket of cotton stolen the night before, as she feelingly expressed it to me, "basket and all." These superstitions are very expensive, as they lead to large sums of money being spent to secure peace from and for their dead. A Cantonese compradore who had, in the service of a European firm, used his opportunities to trade with much skill, and had accumulated a large fortune, spent about seventy or eighty thousand pounds sterling in three years while endeavouring to secure a proper place to bury his mother. The wise men had continually discovered some malign influence in each successive place that was chosen. They have many superstitious beliefs in regard to the perpetuating physical strength. They think the powder of the tusks of the hog-deer (a new species lately described by Mr Swin-


hoe, very common in China, which has two projecting tusks that overlap the lower jaw) will give an old man the energy of youth. For the same reason a wild-boar's stomach is sold for fourteen shillings, where a pound of the flesh can be bought for fivepence. Parts of the human body are believed to possess special virtue. The human heart is supposed to make a man brave. It is probably not often eaten except in times of war. It is this class of superstitions that the late troubles have brought into prominence. As an example of the facility with which these reports spread, when even of the silliest nature, I may instance the "paper man," which has spread great alarm this summer in the populous and important city of Chinkiang. A correspondent of the 'Shanghai Evening Courier' writes on the 9th July of this year as follows:—

"For some days past the Chinese at Chinkiang and Yangchow have been considerably excited over a most absurd rumour. It is supposed that the 'paper man' (that is the name by which the rumour is known) is a kidnapper. He is spoken of as a 'foreigner' by the Chinese, and his reputed object is to kidnap, kill, or injure the natives; and in order to accomplish his object without the

possibility of detection, he transforms himself, by the aid of some mysterious power, into paper. At times, it is asserted, he will appear as a scrap of plain paper; at other times he comes in the guise of an old newspaper. A favourite dodge with him is to get himself made into a kite. He thereby accomplishes his object of getting into people's houses with greater facility.

"At all events he contrives while out of the flesh to have wind blow him into the house, or gets carried in by some means; there he lies as a piece of paper until all the inmates go to bed at night. When all the family are asleep suspecting no danger, and the doors are fastened, the 'paper man' assumes the flesh again and carries out his diabolical designs.

"As soon as it was reported that the 'paper man' had come, the people sought the advice of some wise man, and he advised that a basin of water, which had been used for bathing by the female members of the various families, be kept in each house, and that every piece and scrap of paper be sprinkled with that water. One drop of it would certainly give the 'paper man' his quietus. Of course the foolish people are all hunting up bathing-water and sprinkling all the




old scraps of paper, and they seem to have great faith in the remedy."

The Chinese people are then as superstitious as they are ignorant. Their superstition differs from the superstition of Western peoples in the magnitude of the results to which it sometimes leads.

There are two other qualities of the Chinese to which at present I only allude, but which it is necessary to bear in mind. One of these is, their natural kindliness of disposition and hospitality. When not excited by some unusual cause, this hospitality is extended freely to the foreigner. It has been asserted, and I think generally believed in this country, that the Chinese people are naturally hostile to foreigners. It is not so. My experience in travelling in China is very small compared with that of many others, but it has been sufficient to give me the most perfect confidence in the kindness to be met with from the Chinese, both in districts where foreigners occasionally go and where I should be the first foreign visitor. I had lately occasion to travel to a city north-east from Yangchow, where there had been no foreign visitors previous to my going there. I had been summoned to see the wife of a retired

mandarin, but the poor lady had died seven days before I got there. I was met with a message entreating me to return at once, as the people might injure me. I knew this to be untrue, and spent the day visiting the city and conversing with the people, who were delighted to know about foreign customs, and treated me very hospitably. On my way back I learned from the guide who had been sent with me, that the mandarin did not wish it to be known by those of his own class that he had invited a foreigner to the city; hence his desire to get me away at once. Scores of foreigners travel hundreds of miles in the interior every winter in pursuit of game, and never meet with anything but assistance from the Chinese, who are always civil, and ready to lend their boats to ferry men and dogs across the creeks. An American lately travelled nine months through the central provinces, and supported himself by the sale of Bibles. Mr Ney Elias has surveyed the whole course of the Yellow River without disturbance from the Chinese. Last spring, Messrs Swinhoe, Michie, and Francis were absent three months in the west of China, and reported the inhabitants as friendly. Mr Wylie travels in the more distant regions of China



three or four months at a time, and he has assured me of his never having met with opposition. In an account he has given of his latest journey he says: "While we were at the capital of Szechuen [Ching-too] a plague was raging in the city, and people were dying at the rate of eighty per day. The epidemic was a kind of cholera. Consequent on this there was an extraordinary display of idol processions through the city, with a view to avert the calamity; and as it is just at such times that the people become more than ordinarily excited, I take it as a proof of the pacific character of the population that we mixed freely in the crowd without the slightest molestation. We found them remarkably well disposed towards us, and I cannot recall anything offensive during our intercourse with them."

Baron von Richthofen has been travelling in China for about two years, only occasionally coming to the treaty ports. He has sometimes found rudeness amongst mining populations, but as a rule he finds the people uniformly civil. He does not find that intrusting himself to the Chinese has imperilled his life. Since the news of the Tientsin massacre has spread to the interior he has found it necessary to give up his

exploration for the present. I will not accumulate proofs, as I easily might, but state broadly that amongst the people of China, as distinguished from the mandarins, there is no natural dislike of foreigners. This is important to bear in mind, because it has been insinuated by the paid agents of the Chinese Government that there is a dislike amongst the people to foreigners, and they have unfortunately been believed to such an extent that I suppose those who are badly informed about China will be astonished to find it denied. It has been denied, however, by those best qualified to judge—the whole of the Europeans who have travelled in China, and by nearly all who reside there. The exceptions amongst residents are one or two of the servants of the Chinese Government who have been countenanced in their assertions by an English diplomatist who has unfortunately placed himself at issue with the rest of his countrymen on nearly every question regarding our policy in China, but whose means of observation have been far less than any of the authorities I have quoted. It is the false assumption that the Chinese people are not ready to welcome us that has put our policy on the wrong track for the last ten years.

The other characteristic of the Chinese people which it is necessary to bear in mind in connection with this exposition, is their astonishing cruelty when their passions are excited to assault and bloodshed. This they have in common with some other Asiatic tribes. It is associated with a great reluctance to resort to personal violence. Assaults are very uncommon amongst the Chinese. But when they begin to indulge their passion for torture they lose all sense of pity, and gloat in the pain they inflict. If a Chinaman catches a thief on his premises, he will suspend him by the hair for hours with only his big toes resting on the ground. If in war he defeats his enemy, he knows no mercy nor quarter. He kills in order to destroy, more than for victory ; and in punishing, his object is to inflict the greatest amount of pain his victim can endure. His cruelties combine the ferocity of the tiger with ingenuity of a naturally clever people. It is evident, then, that there is a grave responsibility incurred by a Government when anything is done that will prevent the most absolute protection for its subjects against the bare possibility of being exposed to the fury of a Chinese mob. It is needless to apply the principles that regulate our action towards civilised


countries to a country where there is a capability on the part of the people of their acting with less reason and more cruelty than wild beasts. That a European should ever have fallen a victim to this fury in China since the last war is an everlasting disgrace to British diplomacy, which, while it represented the only country with a large stake in China, has abandoned year by year the prestige that it had cost a war to obtain.

So much for a few traits of the Chinese people. I have now to state a few characteristics of a class in China of whom much is heard—the mandarins. And it is necessary here first to disabuse the mind of the reader from a common mistake that has been made in regard to the mode of obtaining government service in China. It is commonly believed that the mandarins are chosen by competitive examination, and that merit in scholarship is the passport to office. This mistake has arisen from the confounding the large class of scholars who have obtained literary degrees, and are therefore eligible for office, with the smaller class of persons who actually hold it. Although it is beside my subject, I cannot help stating what I think only became known lately, that bribery is largely practised in the examination-halls. A

Chinese reformer named Ch'ien Pao Leen, in calling attention to this, says enormous amounts are levied from the students in the form of presents and illegal fees. It would indeed have been wonderful if anything could be found in China into which bribery did not enter as part of the system. The actually ruling mandarins obtain their office either by buying it for so much money or by the gift or good offices of a patron. Large presents in money are given yearly by the small to the large mandarins, and they all of them maintain numbers of their relatives about them. From the highest to the lowest, even to the ragged police-officers, the pay is only nominal. Every man makes the most he can out of his position by plundering the people wherever they will bear it. If a rich man compromises himself and comes into the hands of the mandarins, he is heavily fleeced. A Chinese merchant some time ago absconded with about £6000 belonging to an English firm in Shanghai. Application was made to the district magistrate for his capture, but it was declared that he could not be found. It was afterwards ascertained that he had been secreted for two months in the official residence of the district magistrate, where he had had to disgorge

the whole of the money in small sums to the underlings of the office as bribes for not giving him up. There is a court in Shanghai for the trial of Chinese who are accused by foreigners. The court is presided over by a mandarin, assisted by a gentleman from the British Consulate, and is called the *Mixed Court*. I once prosecuted a servant in it for a very gross offence. He was sentenced to forty blows on the back and a fortnight's imprisonment. I met him walking in the streets the following day with a sound skin. He had been liberated for a bribe of two dollars. This was an instance of what was of daily occurrence. The gentlemen from the Consulate were not able to check it, and did not think it inconsistent with their dignity to register sentences that were never carried out. When the British courts were first instituted in Hong-Kong, the Chinese thought that the fees they paid the lawyers were the bribes for the judges, and the larger the fee charged the better they thought their chance of a verdict in their favour. To further illustrate their character I quote the following instance of how justice is administered amongst themselves:—

“A man from one of the northern provinces, who



had formerly been a tea-merchant, but having lost his money had settled in Canton as a doctor, and resided for several years in a respectable street in the western suburb, was returning home one day at noon, when he was, at the distance of about a hundred paces from his own door, attacked by five men, two of whom held his hands, while one seized him by the throat and stopped his mouth, and the remaining two robbed him of a watch and twenty taels of silver he had about him. [A tael is worth about six shillings.] It was done in an instant; but as he shouted 'Thieves!' the moment his mouth was free, the neighbouring shopmen, who had been attracted by the struggle, but had not had time to see what was actually going on, succeeded in capturing one of the fellows. This man the doctor had, according to the advice of his friends, taken to the nearest temple, and then called the householders of his street, by beat of gong, to a consultation. They admitted that as the doctor was an inhabitant of their street, and had been robbed in it in open day, the matter was a public one, concerning them generally; and intimated to him their readiness to disburse, according to their custom, one-half of the expense of handing the prisoner over to the mandarins, if he

[the doctor] would pay the other half. This he agreed to do, and as some of the householders had friends in the yamun [*office*] of the local military mandarin, which is situated in the same suburb, the prisoner was taken there and received on payment of about three dollars as fees. The mandarin, a lieutenant, handed the prisoner over to the district magistrate of Manghai, as the local civil authority, at the same time sending in a report to his superior officer showing that he had captured the man. The latter, on being examined by the district magistrate, declared that the doctor owed him money and would not pay him ; and as he belonged to a gang that was connected with the yamun [the official residence] of the district magistrate, the matter ended in the doctor's being summoned to the yamun, detained there ten days, and, far from recovering his stolen money and watch, only liberated after paying about fifteen dollars, while the robber was set free unpunished."

Mr Thomas Taylor Meadows, from whose 'Desultory Notes' I quote the above, and who is not prejudiced against the Chinese, says, in speaking of the mandarin system : " One and the same mandarin is judge in matters of life and death over people

from whom he collects the revenue, and among whom he also acts as justice of the peace, sheriff, and coroner — a system that not only renders extortion and the commission of all kinds of injustice safe and easy, but also entirely precludes all the well-known benefits to be derived from the division of labour.”

The system is radically wrong. It acts on the assumption that every mandarin is a man of pure virtue, and serves his country for a pittance from the simple desire to do good. But this deceives no one, nor does any one pretend to be deceived. It is well known how much money a place can be made worth. It is not considered dishonourable to take bribes, and it was currently reported amongst the Chinese last year that a well-known mandarin named Ting, who had fallen into disgrace by his adopted son having committed murder, and who made a journey to the capital to plead his cause, found the best argument to be a gift of £10,000 to one of the Imperial family. Ting himself lately memorialised the throne about the corruption of his class, and gave a striking picture of the necessity which compels them to be corrupt. He says: “The sale of office has been established in every quarter, and the price has

been lowered for the purpose of getting purchasers. The price of office having been lowered several tenths below the regulated price, it might be said to have reached the limit of compassionate accommodation. . . . So great is the variety of these sales, that men bent on speculation, not only those of but moderate circumstances, come knocking at the door for office; even the naked poor, who have no means of making a living, gather a little here and collect a little there, in order to make merchandise of office, thinking that with an office bought for a thousand some hundred taels, on their arrival at their station, as soon as they can get a situation, they can draw several ten taels a-month, and at once receive a good percentage of profit on their investment. And if, perchance, they get temporary charge of an office or full possession of a vacancy, whether they make the less sum of some thousands or the greater of some tens of thousands, they seek only their individual advantage, regardless of the injury to the public welfare. . . . How can such a class, by nature unreliable and sordid, be expected to cherish the people? Coming now to the getting, in ten and more years, one year's office as a substitute, out of this year must come the ex-

penses of the preceding ten and more years for clothes and food, the cost of maintaining a family, and returning favours ; and besides, in this one year of temporary office, provision must be made for the future. To place dogs and sheep before a hungry tiger, and expect him not to seize and eat them, although you should make a show of preventing him with a stout bow and poisoned arrows, would certainly be to expect an impossibility."


Virtuous outbursts like the above are not uncommon in China. They are referred to some board to report, and there is an end of them. But Ting, in his quaint Chinese way, tells the truth.

The misfortune of this parcelling out of a province amongst revenue-farmers is to prevent the undertaking of public works, or of any measure that would comprehensively increase the public wealth. Millions are lost yearly by inundations because a few hundred thousands are not laid out on embankments. In point of actual loss to wealth and human life, the breaking-out of the Yellow River—"China's Sorrow"—is perhaps the greatest misfortune that happens at any one time in the world. Yet I am assured by competent observers that European engineers, at a compar-

atively small cost, could prevent this river bursting its banks. But the Chinese mandarins will neither repair the embankments themselves nor employ foreigners to do it for them, for the simple reason that during their short term of office their only object is to fill their purses and escape rich. The people are too ignorant to know that the mandarins could benefit them, and are patient until they are starving. Then, when things cannot be worse, they kill the mandarins and plunder their richer neighbours, until the next season's crops convert them again into honest men.

Although, as a rule, the mandarins are nearly as ignorant as the people, they have a great contempt for them. A retired official of my acquaintance had a favourite saying: "The common people are blindly stupid. They are like dogs, and should be treated like dogs."

There is a marked difference between the mandarins and the people in their views of foreigners. From the first they have shown the greatest jealousy of foreigners and everything foreign. Wherever they come in contact with them they feel their own inferiority, and the consciousness of it galls them. Their hatred has not been lessened by the fact of the merchants who deal with



foreigners having acquired wealth, a disposition to resist extortion, and a strength of character of which they stand in awe. Their hatred, always blind, has lately become active, and there is evidence to show that for several years back there has been some attempts at political combination (an unusual thing amongst the Chinese) to drive foreigners out of the country. They will permit no gain either to themselves or the people if it is to be got by means of anything foreign. They will allow a trade to be conducted painfully and dangerously in shallow boats, against rapid streams, with much loss of wealth and life, rather than permit a steamer to do it, although it should be owned and manned by Chinese. Steam is a foreign appliance. For them that is enough. The only foreign appliances they permit are arsenals and powder-mills, and the means of ultimately driving the foreigners out. Of these they have greedily availed themselves during the last few years.

It is perhaps unnecessary to say that the mandarins are untruthful, for that is applicable to all Chinamen, and indeed all Eastern peoples. Still, as the mandarins are supposed to be bound by treaty stipulations, it is necessary to bear in mind that they will not hold to treaties from any feelings of


truth or honour, but only in so far as they have the fear of consequences before them.

It is also to be borne in mind that the mandarins, though nominally under the Pekin Government, are really independent in their own spheres. If they send a part of the revenue-tax to the capital once a-year, and if they can prevent open rebellion, they are practically independent. In the distant provinces they are often independent potentates, scarcely even in name recognising the authority of the Emperor. All that they have to do is to keep things quiet, and disgorge a proportion of their prey—a proportion they take care is very small. If much is asked from them they get up a little rebellion, and write to Pekin that they require all their money to put it down. While they issue imperial proclamations against the cultivation of the poppy, they levy regular duties on it, and give licences to establishments for the control of the trade.

I might write much more about the mandarins, and might largely support what I have written, but fear to weary the patience of my readers before I come to the practical question I have to discuss. What I have written about the official class is essential to the understanding of what


follows, as it is with them that all our past and present troubles in China have arisen, and with whom, if we are not wise, there will be greater troubles in store for us in the future.

It remains for me yet to say a little about the Imperial family, which is nominally the supreme power in the empire. But first I must explain that there is great weight attached to the name of Emperor in China. He is believed to be the vicegerent of Heaven on earth, the Chinese empire being supposed to constitute the whole world except a few barbarous people who are permitted to live on its outer borders. A common name for China amongst the Chinese is "*(What lies)* under heaven." Heaven issues its commands through the Emperor. A rebellion is only justified when a long course of evil fortune has shown that Heaven has withdrawn its confidence from him. Reverence for the Imperial name is taught in the sacred books, along with obedience to parents; and Confucius has more thoroughly indoctrinated the people with reverence for constituted authority, than Christendom has been by the sacred testimony that the "powers that be are ordained of God." This feeling often prevents the overthrow of a dynasty long after it has become powerless.



At the present time it preserves the throne for the Tartar family, who have really little power in the provinces that are at peace, and who have been repudiated in some of the western provinces altogether.

The superiority of the Emperor to all human beings is still maintained at Peking in all its exclusiveness. When the Duke of Edinburgh visited China last October he went to Peking, but his presence there was not acknowledged, and he had no more civility shown him than if he had belonged to the commonest family in England. The difficulty was, that *he could not be received by the Emperor of China as an equal*. His departure must have been a great relief to Sir Rutherford Alcock, who must have felt himself in a strange dilemma between the desire not to offend the prejudices of the Chinese and the wish to see proper respect shown to the son of his sovereign. The Chinese carried the day. The Duke of Edinburgh was not received nor called on, saw almost nothing of Peking, and after being shut up in the embassy for a few days, was sent back to Tientsin in a boat. He had time to think of his position as a prince of England in a new light on his way back in the slow, tedious boat-journey to Tientsin.



I see a clever correspondent of a Shanghai newspaper, who writes from Peking, writes of "british policy in China" with a small *b*. I should suppose he began after the Duke of Edinburgh's visit.

The prestige of the Emperor's name is now almost useless for the practical purposes of government. It is openly defied in many parts of the country by the Mohammedans, and ignored (except theoretically) nearly everywhere. Hordes of rebels approach within a hundred miles of the capital. Where government exists at all it is due to the firmness, wealth, and popularity of the governor of the province; and the Emperor's party at Peking are very careful how they interfere with a powerful mandarin. This impotence it is important to note, because whatever treaty the Emperor of China may be brought to sign, it by no means follows that it will be carried out in the provinces, unless it meet the approval of the local mandarins. The word of the Emperor is powerless over a great extent of the disorganised territory that is composed of the eighteen provinces. China may indeed be said to have no government at all in the true sense of the word. There is no doubt that if the country were very prosperous this want

would scarcely be felt. The Chinese, except when they are starving, are as a rule a peaceful people. There is no hope of the young Emperor improving things. He has been carefully brought up in the old style of Chinese education, and has the reputation of being an idle scholar. He knows nothing of the world outside China, nothing of any science or any useful thing whatsoever. I have no doubt he has been well schooled, according to Confucius, in the duties that pertain to him in the five relations of life. Of actual facts he knows nothing. In so far as he interferes in government it is by the advice of his mother and uncle Prince Kung. The relation in which these two worthy persons stand towards each other will be understood from the following story, which, although it has not hitherto been printed, I can guarantee to be correct, as I found the version of it I got from a well-informed Chinaman agreed in the main particulars with the account that a gentleman in the Chinese Imperial customs received from an official from Tientsin. It will give a clearer idea of the manners and social standing of the Court at Peking than I could give by pages of description. This is the story :—

A favourite eunuch attached to the person of



the Empress-Dowager acquired so much influence over her that he controlled to a certain extent her influence with her son, and received many bribes from persons who were place-hunting. Prince Kung became jealous of the influence of the eunuch, and insisted on his being dismissed. The Empress professed to send him away, but kept him secretly in the palace. This became known to Prince Kung, who set a watch upon his movements. Last spring the Empress sent him incognito on an expedition to buy rare things to be presented to the Emperor. Prince Kung had him dogged by spies until he came into a prefecture where he could depend on the governor. The spies gave the governor a letter from Prince Kung, instructing him to get the eunuch put out of the way. He was arrested on a false charge and under another name, false witnesses attested to his guilt, and he was immediately executed as a vagabond. The exclusiveness of the Tartar coterie that manages the private matters of the Imperial family does not permit much to come to light which enables any judgment to be formed as to the capacity or intentions of its members, but the above incident illustrates the scheming and counter-scheming that take place amongst them. The


Emperor's tutor, Wo-jen, is an obstinate old man, with confessed antipathy to foreigners; and if the dispositions of the young Emperor were of any importance, there is every reason to believe they would be found to be strongly anti-foreign. In the present condition of the Chinese empire it probably matters very little what the likings and dislikings of the Emperor may be. The relations of the Court to the affairs of the Tientsin massacre I believe to be shortly this:—

The Imperial family are innocent of the crime, but after its commission they dared not denounce it in the terms it deserves. Still less dare they punish the leading criminals. They are completely awed by the mandarins, who will compel them to go to war. At a council of twenty mandarins, lately held at Peking, eighteen were for war and two for peace. One of the dissentients said if they knew as much of the strength of foreigners as he did they would be anxious to avoid a contest with them. Prince Kung probably thinks very much as this mandarin, but finds himself powerless.

Having cleared the way by this brief sketch of the different classes with whom foreigners are brought into relation in China—a sketch which

was absolutely necessary if I am to be understood—I will briefly notice the history of the events during the last two years which have now culminated at Tientsin. From the signing of the Convention of Peking in 1860 foreign intercourse was regulated by the conditions of the Treaty of Tientsin, which was signed in 1858. It had been stipulated that this treaty was to be subject to revision at the end of ten years, when it was hoped that extended experience of foreigners would have persuaded the Chinese of the advisability of more liberal concessions to their own people in regard to the conduct of trade. When this time drew near the Chinese Government at Peking secretly requested the advice of some of its powerful officers as to the whole foreign question. Of the secret memorials in reply, a copy of that of the Viceroy Tseng Kwo Fan, at that time resident at Nankin, where he held far more power and authority than the Emperor did at Peking, fell into the hands of foreigners and was translated. It was written in the belief that it would be kept secret, and an opportunity was thus obtained of knowing whether the old spirit of enmity to foreigners had died out in the official mind in China. To the sorrow and surprise of all well-wishers to the


Chinese it was discovered that the mandarin hatred of foreigners was strong as ever. Tseng Kwo Fan in this document assures the advisers of the Emperor that the Chinese had suffered sorely from the arrival of foreigners, which, "though it make the unskilful laugh, cannot but make the judicious grieve." Foreign trade, he says, is permitted only because it cannot be kept out, and our friendship is to be retained only because it is less objectionable than our enmity. We find in this document the first sign that the lessons of the two previous wars are forgotten. If, says Tseng Kwo Fan, the ministers at Peking should obtain concessions favourable to foreigners, he and his fellow-governors would repudiate and oppose them, and would take no pains to restrain popular enmity, which means that its excitement is the weapon they would use in their anti-foreign policy. The three things to be noted in the memorial are, that the mandarins hated foreigners in 1868 as much as they did in 1858, that they would oppose foreigners irrespective of the action of the throne, and that they counted upon the exciting of the passions of the mob to keep foreigners out of the country. From this time a new spirit began to be manifested towards for-



eigners in China, and especially where they were few and unprotected. A series of outrages began to take place in widely distant parts of the country. It is unnecessary to go over the whole of these in detail. I will select three instances as examples, because they illustrate the conditions under which these have taken place, and because they show that no sect of the Christian religion has been spared, and that traders are attacked as well as missionaries—in short, that foreigners are obnoxious to the authorities as foreigners.

In August 1868 a few English missionaries settled in the city of Yangchow, where by the Treaty of Tientsin they were entitled to protection to their property and persons. They, it is now well known, conducted themselves quietly and unobtrusively. Shortly after their arrival meetings were held by some of the gentry of mandarin rank, and it was resolved that the foreigners should be expelled. These men were supported by an intimate friend of Tseng Kwo Fan's, named Yen, a retired mandarin of great wealth; and it was afterwards asserted by the Chinese that the prime instigator of the riot was the Viceroy himself. The means adopted was to create a belief amongst the populace that the foreigners had

killed children to obtain their hearts, eyes, and livers to make philters. The effect of this was that a crowd burned the missionaries' houses, cruelly assaulted the missionaries, and especially insulted and dangerously wounded some of the ladies of the mission. The foreigners fled the city. Mr Medhurst, the English consul at Shanghai, took a man-of-war, the *Rinaldo*, up the Yangtse to the mouth of the small river that leads to Yangchow, where he proceeded with a naval guard. He was refused satisfaction. He then went in the *Rinaldo* to Nankin, and negotiations were going on favourably with the Viceroy when the commander of the *Rinaldo* fell sick and withdrew his ship, and the consul was left in a small yacht. As soon as Tseng Kwo Fan found the ship of war had gone he broke off negotiations and refused to see the consul, who had no course left but to proceed to Shanghai and leave things as they were. Emboldened by the delay that followed at Yangchow, a mandarin at a station farther inland seized and imprisoned the native servants of an English merchant who were in charge of goods. After some delay a naval force ascended the Yangtse, and Tseng Kwo Fan immediately yielded. The magistrates of the city in-




vited the outraged missionaries back, and enjoined the people to behave peaceably towards them. In this brief summary of the "Yangchow case" it is to be noted that the instigators of the crime were the literati and mandarins; that Tseng Kwo Fan, who was insolent to the representative of her Majesty's Government as long as he was unsupported by force, at once yielded when the ships of war appeared; that not a shot was fired; and that the people were quiet at the bidding of their leaders.

This eminently successful action on the part of the consul was disapproved of by the Home Government, who were then anxious to acknowledge no other power in China than the Government at Peking. But what was the effect at Yangchow? Mr Taylor, the chief of the mission, writing more than a year afterwards, says that he is not only on friendly terms with the people, but that he has been visited by many of the literati who have come to the examinations. But the disapproval of the British Government became known in China, and produced a bad effect on the official mind near the ports.

The same year the Treaty of Tientsin was grossly violated at the treaty port of Tai-wan-foo at For-

mosa. In April 6000 dollars' worth of camphor had been bought for Messrs Elles & Co. in Wuchai, to the north of Tai-wan-foo, in consistency with the terms of the treaty. It was seized and forcibly carried off by the agents of the mandarin of the district. In the same month the officials encouraged infamous stories regarding Catholic and Protestant missionaries, and permitted the destruction of their chapels. At Petaou a Catholic and a Protestant chapel were destroyed, and the same day a Protestant catechist was brutally assaulted in the streets, and then shut up in prison for seven weeks by the mandarin. On the 24th another Protestant catechist was murdered in open day in the streets, his body cut in pieces, and his heart eaten by some of his murderers. In June, Mr Hardie, the agent of Messrs Tait & Co. at Tai-wan-foo, was suddenly attacked by one of the official servants of the Lekin office, who stabbed him in the chest with a knife, and Mr Hardie with difficulty escaped with his life. *The man was not punished.* On the 29th of August, Lord Scott of H.M. ship Icarus and the consul had an interview with the mandarin, who lost his temper, struck the consul, and left the room. In August, Mr Pickering, of Messrs



Elles & Co., had proceeded to Conchai under the permission of the acting consul. The Taotai gave orders to have him destroyed, an attempt defeated by Mr Pickering's bravery. In October, Messrs C. D. Kerr and G. S. Bird, of the firm of Messrs Dodd & Co., were, while on a visit to Banca, mobbed and severely injured, barely escaping with their lives. Their compradore was forced to fly, leaving in the hands of the Chinese the money, &c., in his possession.

Appeals to the governor of Fuhkien, the superior of the mandarin of Formosa, resulted in a mandarin being sent to put a stop to these assaults. He did nothing, being either powerless or unwilling—probably both. Reports to the ambassador at Peking had no result, as indeed was to be expected. Things got so bad that the acting consul, Mr Gibson, thought it his duty to subdue the refractory mandarin by the help of a gunboat, and peace was restored. Mr Gibson fell under the severe displeasure of the English Government, and was publicly condemned by Lord Clarendon, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was a man of weak health, having continued to suffer from a wound received in the last China war. He took the reprimand of the Government much to

heart, and he died shortly afterwards, the victim, as it was believed in China, of great injustice.

The recital of the Formosa outrages again shows that it is the mandarins who originate the attacks on foreigners. Further, it should convince those persons in this country who think that all the troubles in China are due to missionaries that they are mistaken. It further shows that the only way to secure peace is to act promptly on the spot where the peace is broken. I would further ask my readers to picture to themselves the state of mind of Englishmen in China, who see their fellow-subjects cut down and brutally treated almost within sight of her Majesty's ships, while not a finger is raised to punish, or protect them.

One more case must be related, because it is more than probable that it was the policy pursued in regard to it that emboldened the Tientsin people to murder the French this summer. On the 25th June 1869 the Rev. James Williamson and Mr Hodge anchored opposite a village for the night, thirty-five miles from Tientsin. They were attacked during the night. Mr Williamson was killed and Mr Hodge escaped. The occupants of the boat were well-known Protestant missionaries,



and it was notorious did not travel with much money. It is improbable, then, that robbery was the cause of the murder, which was committed by a band of twenty-five armed men who had followed the boat for two days. It was suspicious that Mr Hodge, shortly after escaping, met a mandarin and a party of followers coming towards the boat. The murderers were never arrested, although they must have been seen by several thousand Chinese the previous day. By this time the Clarendon policy was adopted by British officials. No action was taken on the spot, but proper representations were made to Peking. They might as well have been made to the man in the moon. Mr Williamson's murder is still unpunished; yet there is scarcely an intelligent foreigner in China, and not one Chinaman, who doubts that, if the mandarins of the district had been responsible for the production of the murderers, they would have been speedily forthcoming. Two months after the murder a Shanghai newspaper commented on the inactivity of the authorities in the following prophetic words: "If violent acts like these are winked at, the impression produced on the Chinese will be that we are impotent to avenge the taking of life; and murder, which is always easy, will be practi-

cally invited by the immunity extended to the murderers of Mr Williamson. Such consequences are too serious to be forgotten or submitted to, and they demand the promptest attention." There was no prompt attention. The protector of British interests in China was busy spelling British with a small *b*, and persevering with unswerving obstinacy, regardless of facts, in a line of conduct which it was universally declared, by those who knew the Chinese, would end in more violence. The spell that for ten years had preserved the sacredness of the lives of foreigners was broken, and no sufficient measures were taken to form it anew. When in another year the victims happened to be the pious and good Sisters of Mercy, we were told it was no particular business of ours—"It is only the French"!

Having shown that the Tientsin massacre is only the last and greatest of a series of attacks on foreigners, I will now briefly state the amount of guilt that is chargeable upon the mandarins in that instance. The crowd were infuriated for weeks by continual reports that the kidnappers were employed by the French to steal children, and at the same time rumours were circulated amongst the Chinese that all foreigners were to be

exterminated. The day was fixed beforehand on which this was to be done.

The people were excited to the point of making the attack by two acts of the Chi-Fu, one of the mandarins of the city. He published a proclamation implying his belief in the kidnapping crimes, and he executed two men who were falsely accused of kidnapping. Their bodies were cut in ten thousand pieces. He alleged that they confessed the crime. We know enough of the Sisters of Mercy to know how absurdly false the accusation was, and it is now known that the poor men were simply travellers who had their own children with them. But the excitement of the mob was now intense.

Now was the time for Chung How to interpose to protect foreigners and maintain peace. He could not be ignorant of what all the Chinese in Tientsin knew. He had the power of life and death in his hand; and after the French had been murdered, when the crowd was making its way to the foreign settlement to kill the other foreigners, it turned back at once at his orders. He told them their quarrel was with the French only, and they had finished it. He did not answer the letters of the English consul pointing out the danger. The

man who beat the first gong came out of his residence. It matters little to us, in regard to the future protection of foreigners, whether he was unwilling or unable to interpose; but there is very little doubt that he was unwilling. I do not know that there is any evidence that directly proves his complicity, nor is it likely that such evidence could ever be got; but there is ample evidence to prove that he refused to interpose his authority to prevent the massacre. He consented to the death of the French by not preventing it. He is morally and politically guilty.

Intelligent Chinamen in Shanghai say that he is the real criminal, and that the French, if they wish security for the future, should have him beheaded.

The most active leader of the murderers was a military mandarin named Cheng Kwo Shwai. He is the adopted son of the celebrated Chinese general San-Ko-lin-sin, and during the war with England—1859-1862—was one of his most active lieutenants. He was at Yangchow when the troubles broke out there against Mr Taylor's party, and was one of the instigators. He had previously boasted that he would give foreigners a lesson. Shortly before the Tientsin massacres he had stirred up a violent anti-foreign feeling

at Nankin, and travelling northwards, inflammatory placards were pasted up along his route. After a visit to Tseng Kwo Fan at a place called Pau-ting-foo, he arrived at Tientsin three days before the massacre with several hundred troops. He was the leader of the fire-guilds against the hospital of the Sisters of Mercy, to the cry of "On! good children, on!" He had had no business at Tientsin, and it is suspected that he came there for the purpose of heading an attack against foreigners. Immediately afterwards he went to Pekin and had audience of the Emperor, and returned to Tientsin in high favour. He subsequently returned to Pekin. He is one of the three mandarins whom Count Rochedouart, the French ambassador, has demanded shall be given up for execution. We know that the ultimatum has been refused. The Chinese have said from the first that Cheng Kwo Shwai would never be given up.

Tseng Kwo Fan, the viceroy of Chihli, has been accused of instigating the massacre. There is no proof of this, but his connection with Cheng Kwo Shwai is suspicious. There is no reason to suppose that the Emperor's family at Pekin had anything to do with it, but the reception of Cheng Kwo Shwai while his hands were still

red with the blood of his victims was in bad taste.


In confirmation of the opinion that the mandarins are responsible for all these outrages, whether in connection with superstitious rumours or not, I may mention that the first edict that appeared in Peking after the massacre gave an untruthful account of it, and foreigners were threatened by the populace. A second edict calmed all the excitement in one day. When the news came to Chefoo, there was a similar attempt to get up an attack on foreigners. The mandarin put it down at once by sentencing the ringleader to two hundred blows, and by a proclamation to the people. A short proclamation of the Taotai and a few blows at once quelled a threatening excitement in Shanghai a year ago, which arose from some blackguards having put up a notice that foreigners had buried eighteen Chinamen under the foundation of the new church. The mandarins can, as a rule, at their will control any popular riot that does not depend on starvation. Whether foreigners are to be safe or not at any given place, depends on whether the mandarin happens to be favourable to foreigners or the reverse. To this, at least, it has now come.

The question that all I have written is meant to

lead to is, What steps must be taken by foreign Powers, and especially that of England, to secure a permanent peace in China? What I have already said must show that things cannot go on as they are. It cannot be allowed by the people of England that their fellow-subjects, who have settled in China in the faith of treaties ratified by their Government, are to be made to feel that their lives and property are in continual jeopardy, and be obliged to drill and mount guard, and prepare to defend their lives, when they should be attending to their business. To give a satisfactory solution to this question, I must remind my readers that for eight years after the last war in China there was peace for both merchant and missionary.

Since then things have been going from bad to worse for both. The reason it is important to note. It is this: The result of the last war was to create in the minds of the mandarins a belief that foreigners were powerful and ready to punish whoever attacked them, and wherever they were attacked. Our prestige was a shield to us. When they ceased to be afraid of us, our prestige was no protection; and for the last few years we have been imperilled by the machinations of a few of the more daring mandarins. It is instructive to

know why the mandarins have ceased to fear the foreigner, but the causes are not many or far to seek. They have been allowed to employ foreign drill-instructors, and build arsenals with foreign supervision. Li Hung Chang at Soochow and Nankin has by the assistance of Dr Macartney laid up almost an incredible store of powder, cannon, and ammunitions of war. Chung How has been doing the same at Tientsin with the assistance of Mr Meadows. This gave confidence to others, and they began to think they were ready to fight. Then came the small beginnings of petty obstacles thrown in the way of carrying out the treaty, in which the Chinese were allowed to gain their purpose. Hence more and larger complications, in which they were still victorious. Their old policy of lies and procrastination was met by argument and expostulation instead of determination. Then came the loss of influence by the British ambassador at Peking, for which either he or his Government are responsible. The measure of the contempt of the Chinese was full when they were able to match foreign diplomacy by the quiet aid of Mr Hart, who to the office of Inspector-General of Customs has lately added the functions (without the title) of Minister for




Foreign Affairs, in which capacity he advised the appointment of the late Mr Burlingame. Then came the fruits of the Burlingame policy in instructions from home that diplomatic action at Peking and London was to supersede measures of self-defence against the attacks of uncivilised savages, who cared as little for Peking as they did for London. And last, and most fatal of all, came the apology from the Government of great Britain to the Chinese for the action of Mr Gibson at Formosa, an apology which to the Chinese meant only one thing—that England was now afraid of them. If it were not that I would make this paper too long, I could fill pages with extracts from the newspapers in China prophesying that all this would lead to massacres of foreigners. We could not in China have believed that such infatuation on the part of the Home Government was possible. Whatever information they may have received from the embassy at Peking, they had the history of the two previous wars to guide them; and from these they might have learned that the mandarins were ignorant and treacherous, and that the only way to prevent a war is to stamp out the first signs of infidelity to treaty engagements.

Our footing in China has been sacrificed to a desire to act towards the Chinese as if they were civilised, and to treat only with the Government at Peking as if it represented China as the Czar does Russia ; whereas the Chinese are uncivilised, in the true sense of the word, and their central Government exists only as a figment of the imagination. What is the use of having an ambassador at Peking, it will be asked, if every mandarin is to be treated with in his own province ? The answer to this question (which is the formula of the embassy) is, that if it is only in the province and with the mandarin that local troubles can be satisfactorily settled, the embassy at Peking is not so useful as embassies elsewhere. This is unfortunate, but true. It is very probable that if the embassy at Peking had not existed during the last five years, we would have been in less danger of a war with China at the present moment. It is in the nature of men to overestimate the value of their own exertions, and it is due to this weakness that affairs in the provinces of China have been allowed to drift on towards a war, our ambassador being too easily satisfied as long as he maintained friendly relations with a few semi-barbarous and ignorant men more than a thousand

miles away from the scene of complications—a thousand miles in China meaning in point of time what it did in Europe before the days of mail-coaches and steam-engines. The embassy has acted as if it were at the capital of a Government that had the means of knowing what took place in the country, and the power of punishing what was wrong; whereas it was at the capital of a Government that had no means of knowing what went on beyond its own immediate district, and was powerless except in a very few parts of the empire. If the embassy had acted otherwise, it must have confessed that it was comparatively useless, and that the consular establishments were as important in China as they were before the last war. This confession would have required more self-denial than seems to have existed. This is an age of economy in Government establishments, which is much to be commended. But it is more to the point to know that money has obtained its worth. It would be instructive to know what the country has got for the money spent on the Peking embassy during the last five years. We are in a worse position now than we were then. It is useless now to recriminate against individual men whose indecision has brought about the present

state of affairs ; but to those who are especially interested in some of the controversies that have lately taken place between the diplomatic agents in China and the chambers of commerce, I would state that the downward course has been pointed out step by step both in China and at home. At home, indeed, the persistent refusal of the leading newspapers to publish anything from China that opposed the policy of Mr Burlingame and Sir Rutherford Alcock made it impossible to procure a hearing. It happened that the men in China who took an interest in public affairs were Liberals in politics, and sent their contributions to the Liberal press. The policy of the Liberal Government had been adopted on imperfect and false information, and the newspapers refused to publish anything against their policy. This reason was even assigned by the editor of one of these newspapers to a contributor in Shanghai as a reason why his communication was not printed. The press is very powerful as an active agent, but is equally powerful in its capacity of a suppressor of information. It is due to this power of suppression that the Tientsin massacre came on the people of England as a surprise, while something of the kind has been expected in China since the



reception of Lord Clarendon's instructions. Now that this event has brought out fuller information, the tone of the press is completely altered, and there is little fault to be found with the spirit in which the subject has been handled. The situation has been understood and explained with tolerable accuracy by all the leading journals. But there has been a strange abstinence from suggestion of remedies for the present or guarantees for the future. It is admitted that something must be done, but no one yet has been bold enough or confident enough in his knowledge to say what it is to be. If I have explained myself with sufficient fulness and clearness, I should now be in a position to indicate what seems to me to be the only satisfactory basis on which we can now have relations with China.

If foreigners are to be safe in China, the mandarin of each district must be made responsible for their safety, and that responsibility must not be to the Emperor at Peking, but to the nearest foreign consul. If this course be undertaken there will be no more massacres. There must be no long correspondences between the coast and Peking, and perhaps to Europe, during which the time to strike is lost, and punishment, if it were to be

inflicted, would be inflicted in vain. The mandarin must be assured that the crime will bring speedy punishment. The person of a foreigner must be made to be sacred. Assaults and murders must be instantly punished, and with severity. An intelligent Chinaman at Tientsin, speaking of the massacre to an Englishman, said, "A few years ago no one dare touch the dog of a foreigner, now foreigners themselves are killed with impunity!" The former times must be brought back again. It is useless for us to attempt to fathom the labyrinths of plot and falsehood which conceal the clue to these demonstrations against foreigners, because we can never get at the truth. But we know that the mandarins can prevent them occurring if they choose, and they will choose if their own safety is involved. This we can understand, and it is on this we must act.

This course of action seems so arbitrary and summary, is so different from what would be done in any civilised country, that it is necessary for me to explain why it should be recommended for China. The first reason (which might seem sufficient) is, that it is the only method that will succeed. If some of the prefects of France were to

be proved to have been instrumental in stirring up city mobs to kill a few resident Englishmen, the proper course would be to demand justice from the French Government, because the French Government in ordinary times would possess sufficient power to punish the guilty and take measures that would prevent similar massacres, not only where they had occurred, but in other parts of the country. The Chinese Government, even if it has the will (which would sometimes be doubtful), has not the power to do this. Not more than one or two emperors of the present dynasty have had such power. The present Emperor certainly has not. But the mandarins, though they fear not Peking, fear a gunboat ; and as it is only by fear they can be with certainty made to encourage favourable relations with foreigners, we must make them amenable to that that they fear. But here the Oriental character comes into play. If the mandarins fear, they will not only cease to molest, but will become friendly. Fear with them is akin to respect, and this respect will become much more akin to love with a Chinaman than it ever could with a European. Let me assure the respecters of the sovereign rights of peoples that this respect for the person of the European will

not hurt the Chinaman's respect for himself. When once he is assured that this course of action is best for his material interests, there is no morbid feeling of false patriotism that will make him unhappy. Patriotism does not exist in China, and cannot therefore be misapplied.

We must at once give up the absurd hypothesis on which we have lately acted, that the Chinese are civilised. I find in a leading article in the 'Times' of October 7th, the statement that our Government had "agreed to deal with China as with any other civilised State." This is the fundamental error. The Chinese made the first step out of utter savagery to civilisation more than two thousand years ago, but they have never got further. They are destitute of nearly every attribute that entitles a people to be called civilised. The Chinese are very capable of civilisation when the means will be given them, but until now they have never had the chance. It is for the English Government to say whether it will permit its people to confer on China a greater benefit than it has ever been the lot of one race to give to another—the blessings of civilisation to several hundred millions of people.

If the method of local and instant action is



necessary to the safety of Europeans, it should be unnecessary to say more in urging its adoption. But there is more that should be said. It is strictly in accordance with Chinese custom and ideas of justice. In China a mandarin is held by his superior to be responsible for the good conduct of the people of the district under his charge. It is the plan the Chinese themselves adopt. It would therefore not offend their ideas of justice. His power is absolute as long as it exists, and while he is in power he should be held responsible for Europeans as well as for Chinamen.

But it has something which should still more recommend its adoption. It would save life. There would not only be no more murders of foreigners, but there would not be the wars that must always in the end follow them. From the time that the Chinese know that the blood of a foreigner will bring instant vengeance, there will be no more foreign blood shed, and no more Chinese wars. Peace in China can be best maintained by being always ready to strike. We have seen how the opposite policy of tolerance and acceptance of apologies and tardy reparation has ended. Too ardent lovers of peace find themselves face to face with a massacre that will go down to

posterity with Cawnpore and the Black Hole of Calcutta.

It is to the lovers, then, of peace, especially to that portion of the British public who are denominated the "Peace party," that I address myself. I ask them to carry out their principles by using their political influence to urge on the Government such decided measures as will effectually prevent future wars in China. I have said this is only to be done by gunboats. Let me explain myself. I should not only have the European communities in China protected by ships of war, but I consider it fair that the Chinese should pay the cost of them. It is unnecessary to send a larger fleet from England. Gunboats suitable for the service could be built and equipped in China, and manned by Chinamen. European officers, with a small number of experienced seamen and gunners, could make a fleet of this kind very efficient; and the men, if regularly paid, would fight against their own countrymen as readily as against those of any other nation. That Chinamen when led by Europeans can fight well was shown by the successes of Colonel Gordon. But if such a fleet as I allude to were equipped and ready, and permitted to act when necessary, it is

very unlikely that it would ever require to fire a gun. To secure the greatest possible efficiency from these protective forces the Chinese should be required to put Peking in telegraphic communication with all the treaty ports, and to connect Peking with Kiachta by telegraph on the west. Kiachta is the border town between Mongolia and Siberia, and a line thence to Peking would at once put not only Peking but the commercial communities in China in communication with the Governments of Europe. In case of any emergency ambassadors and consular officers could without a fatal delay get advice from their Governments. It is probable that the mandarins would not object much to maintain a number of gunboats, but they would object strongly to the telegraph. But surely it is time now, when life is at stake, to make an end of the sentimental sympathy with the superstitions that have been manufactured to order when a plausible excuse was wanted for objecting to the telegraph. The best way of proving to the Chinese that telegraph-posts do not injure the "luck" of the people is by having them put up. I do not see how foreign Governments, after the circumstances of the Tientsin massacre, can avoid the clear duty

of putting Peking in telegraphic communication with Kiachta on the west, and with Tientsin, Shanghai, and Hong-Kong on the south.


In regard to the gunboats, they would be a great gain to the Chinese if they put down piracy. The saving to native commerce by the suppression of the swarms of pirates that infest the islands on the Chinese coast would repay the expense of a small fleet of gunboats ten times over. This has been done near Hong-Kong on a small scale by the English gunboats, but it is surely fit that it should be done completely by a force that was paid by Chinese money. Thus to protect Europeans by a force paid by the Chinese would be a gain to the Chinese themselves.

But whether this particular scheme be approved or not, it is now the unavoidable duty of the British Government to create such an impression amongst the Chinese mandarins as will effectually put a stop to the opposition they are now showing towards foreigners. When this has been done they must take such precautions and give such instructions to their officers as will secure peace for the future. In 1846 Lord Palmerston wrote in reference to China: "I have only to say that wherever British subjects are placed in danger,

in a situation which is accessible to a British ship of war, thither a British ship of war ought to be, and will be ordered, not only to go, but to remain as long as its presence may be required for the protection of British interests." Lord Palmerston little thought that the time would come so soon when commanders of the British navy would be so tied down by instructions that they dare not fire a shot in defence of the homes of several hundred English families and of property worth millions sterling. The excitement amongst the Chinese in Shanghai after the news of the Tientsin massacre was received was so great that an attack was considered as probable. The commanding officers of the two British men-of-war in the harbour said their instructions forbade them firing a gun in defence of the settlement, but expressed their willingness to take the ladies and children on board their ships if they were attacked. It is to be hoped that on the first news of the Tientsin massacre these scandalous instructions were rescinded. The property in manufactured goods and otherwise that was to be permitted to be destroyed under the dumb mouths of British cannon I find estimated in a telegram of October 10th at fifteen millions sterling. Surely

our Government are now convinced of their mistake. Lord Palmerston further observes: "There is no greater incentive to outrage on the part of the turbulent and lawless than a belief that the persons whom they would like to insult or plunder may be assailed with success and plundered with impunity." The remark should be well pondered by his successors. I hope fervently that the day will come when the policy we must now accept will be unnecessary, but that day is nearly as far distant now as it was in 1846. It will come when European ideas and European knowledge have been spread over China in the Chinese language, and when free communication between foreigners and Chinese has rendered impossible the absurd beliefs that are propagated for selfish purposes by unprincipled mandarins.

The immediate question is, What is the punishment that is to follow the Tientsin massacre? It is to be hoped that no separation will be permitted by the British Government between the interests of the French and the English. There can be no greater mistake than to suppose that their interests can be separated. It is the foreign element that the mandarins wish to expel from the country, although in the present case it has suited them to



attack the French. What is their fate to-day may be ours to-morrow—*Hodie mihi, cras tibi*.

A common form of libel that was first printed in the province of Hoonan, entitled 'An Appeal to the Hoonan Province,' and extensively circulated elsewhere, reads thus:—


"Strangers are invading all around; people's hearts are provoked at it. Just speak of these rebellious and barbarous Englishmen: their savage country is the sea-shore, the head of their Government is a woman, and their original race is half man half brute. They are those whom our books call *naked worms* and *men-fish*.

"Wherefore we all, literati, husbandmen, tradesmen, and so forth, let us draw the sword against the common enemy; whoever does not come with us is a traitor, shamefully sold to foreigners."

Yangchow and Formosa show that there is no real distinction made. The French stood loyally by us in the last Chinese war, and since then the policy has been to stand together. Even if the French had not been at war in Europe, and had been free to fight alone in China, it would have been a mistake to abandon the joint policy in China. No alliance could ever be better defended than one whose object is to spread a Christian

civilisation in a lawless and pagan country. But now our honour as well as our policy demands that we should avenge the insult. Will it be said that Englishmen will allow Christian ladies to be torn to pieces by savages before their eyes, and, because they are Catholics and Frenchwomen, will turn aside with a heartless shrug and say the quarrel is not ours? And yet what else does it mean that the English *chargé-d'affaires* in China should ask the Protestant clergymen whose houses were demolished by the mob and who saved their lives by flight to send their bill for damage done to their property? The reply did them honour. They refused to take any satisfaction for their loss while the blood of their sisters was unaccounted for. I entreat the Government and people of this country not to disgrace the national honour by the cold-blooded selfishness that it is feared will be urged upon them of leaving the French to stand alone in China in the day of their trouble. Want of action at the present crisis will be a heavy blow to the cause of civilisation.

We have been told that instructions have been sent out in a general way "to support the French." This is not enough, and, I venture to say, will mean nothing to those at the head of affairs in




China. Instructions should be sent out to demand the execution of the guilty mandarins and of a dozen of the ringleaders of the mob. The execution of the mandarins has already been demanded by the French and refused by the Chinese. The demand should again be made in the name of the English, so that there should be no question amongst the Chinese that Europeans will stand by one another. If refused, hostilities should be commenced without loss of time, and directed against any force that opposed the seizure and administration of the province of Chihli, which should be held until the mandarins were given up or seized.

Punishment once inflicted, a proclamation stating the nature of the crime, its punishment, and why the punishment was delayed, should be made public in every large city in the empire. But this is only the first step to take. After this, a commission should visit the governor of every province in the empire, acquaint him with the intention of the treaty Powers to hold him directly responsible for the safety of foreigners who should happen to be within his jurisdiction, and make him clearly understand the nature of the penalties that will follow any outrages upon them. If he disclaims the power to give protection, then he should be

offered the assistance of foreign administrators, to be paid out of the revenues of the province. He should be allowed no middle course between accepting the entire responsibility and accepting a foreign quasi-protectorate. It is evident what a boon it would be to the people of a province where the mandarin felt himself unable to maintain order to have a government that could be depended on, and security against the bands of armed robbers that periodically spread death and desolation amongst millions of harmless people.

If any member of the British Government should do me the honour to read these pages, I wish him to know that some such thorough change of plan as that that I have suggested is believed by nearly every intelligent foreigner in China to be the only way to stop future bloodshed.

It may be that the Government has received information and advice of a different kind from its own sources ; but I would ask two things to be borne in mind, and these I will put in the form of questions. *First*, The Foreign Office must have received information similar to mine from many sources in China, and they cannot be ignorant of the weight of testimony against the well-known views that were at all events lately held




by the Pekin embassy. Is it wise to believe the opinions of one or two men (I am sure there are not half-a-dozen) against those of several thousand men, many of whom equal in education, honesty of mind, and experience in China, the few who have the ear of the Foreign Office? *Second*, Is it not true that the events of the last few years in China have lessened in the Foreign Office its belief in the wisdom of its representatives in China? Judge them by results, and if it is found that they have foreshadowed the events of the last few years, that they have understood the significance of the attacks on foreigners, the hampering of trade, and the arming of the Taku forts that has been going on quietly for two years, then it is to be presumed that their opinions have weight now. But if they have shown themselves blind and confident while other observers have shown themselves foreseeing and distrustful, then the claims of the latter to demand a hearing should not be refused.

It is for our Government now to say whether it will again trust the central Government at Pekin, whose incapacity threatens us with the third war in thirty years, or will profit by experience, and, by taking measures that a fuller knowledge of the country now justifies, will for ever prevent a war

with the Chinese whilst they are in their present uncivilised condition. If it is advised (as I know it will be) still to treat with Peking, and Peking only, I suggest, before such a measure is consented to, two precautions. The crisis is sufficient to warrant the sending out to China a special commissioner. The Government should send out a man of experience, able to judge of commercial as well as political matters, uncommitted to any line of policy, and with full powers to examine and act. He should especially be uncommitted to views any of Chinese politics. Above all, he should be a man of the world, and not a Chinese scholar.

At the same time full reports should be asked from every consul in China, to be forwarded to the Government direct, expressing their views as to the policy of the last five years, their opinions as to the causes of the present crisis, and their advice as to the future. The consuls in China are all of them men of great experience, acquainted with the Chinese people and mandarins. Their collective opinions should have much weight. I know no body of men more capable of giving able advice.

The general reader may perhaps be inclined to



ask about the interests that demand this interference in China, feeling probably that only very strong interests should justify our intercourse with the Chinese at all. Few people in this country understand the very great interest that England has in that country. This interest is twofold. There is the missionary question, the mere mention of which acts like a red rag upon some of our politicians both at home and in China. It is difficult to find a calm estimate taken of the position of missionaries in China. There are, no doubt, exaggerated views held regarding their success by many of their supporters in this country; but there has perhaps been nothing said so wide of the truth as a statement made in the House of Lords, that the missionaries are either "rascals or enthusiasts." The statement must have been made in gross ignorance of the men of whom it was spoken. I have met many of the English, American, and Catholic missionaries in China, and I have invariably found them to be earnest and honest men. The Catholic missionaries live as Chinamen; and although their mode of life would be a hard one to persons accustomed to luxury at home, I am inclined to think that the contrast is not great between their

condition in China and that to which they were born and in which they were brought up in Europe. They live as well as a Chinaman can live, have the best kind of Chinese houses, plenty of pork, fish, eggs, tea, and rice, and cultivate vegetables for themselves; and some of the native wine that I have tasted at their tables is by no means to be despised—certainly to be preferred to the thin *vin rouge* of a cheap dinner at the restaurants of the Quartier Latin. From the little I have seen of the peasant life of France I believe that they have reason, as far as mere worldly comforts go, to congratulate themselves that they have chosen to teach the Chinese as missionaries instead of remaining in the paternal cottage. These remarks apply to the rank and file of the French priests. Amongst the superiors there are some able scholars and accomplished gentlemen. In addition to teaching the Christian religion they succour the distressed and minister to the sick, and receive great respect from the poor people amongst whom they dwell, who appreciate their kindness and benevolence. Their private life is in every respect irreproachable. They have had considerable success in their missionary work, the Catholics in China probably numbering several

millions. It requires a less mental effort for a Chinaman to become a Catholic Christian than to be a Protestant. The ceremonial is something tangible. There is something to do, which when it is done his mind is at rest. There may be other causes, but this seems to me to be the chief cause of the success of the Catholics. Their religion, furthermore, is not of a very demonstrative kind. A servant I once had, who came from Peking, was several months in my house before I knew him to be a Catholic. I missed him one Sunday morning, and found that he had gone to confession. He told me his family had been Catholics for four generations.

The Protestant missionaries occupy a very different position in China. As a rule they do not lay aside their distinctive character as Europeans. Their success has been very small indeed. I have read in China, and since I came home, accounts of very successful Protestant missions in parts of China that I have not visited, and these accounts I believe to be in the main accurate. But as far as my observation goes—my experience on this matter being confined to Shanghai—the results amount to something very small compared to the efforts that are being made. These lead some men

to condemn the utility of Protestant missions altogether. The missionaries have not only to bear the disappointment of working apparently in vain, but to see their efforts condemned as useless by friends whose judgment they must to a certain extent respect. My own belief, and the opinion of an able missionary of much learning and experience of my acquaintance, is, that too much time is lost preaching the Gospel to people who take no interest in it, and whose ignorance and callous state of mind make it impossible that an interest can be aroused. The opinion of the missionary to whom I refer is, that the home societies do much harm by requiring reports and interesting letters for their meetings, the preparation of which is the snare of the young missionary, whose time for the first five years of his life in China should be devoted exclusively to a study of the language, literature, and thoughts of the people whom he will subsequently seek to influence. Certain it is, that as immediate results are not to be got, it is worth consideration if it would not be wiser to give up attempting to get them, and concentrate the energies of the missionaries upon the translation and editing of educational works that would bring the native mind, if not to embrace

Christianity, at all events to see the absurdities of many of their own superstitions.

But it is not on religious grounds at all that I claim the protection of the British Government to the fullest extent for Protestant missionaries. I believe that the history of British intercourse with China imposes on us a duty in regard to the civilising of that country, and on whether we fulfil that duty or not depend the happiness and life of millions of people. One of the essential and fundamental elements in this civilising process is the communication of knowledge to the Chinese. I have previously said that they are in a condition of abject ignorance. Knowledge of any kind whatever is valuable to them, as it teaches them that there is something else in the world than disquisitions on the five relations of life. Therefore I look upon it as a great thing for China that hundreds of thousands, perhaps a good many millions, are at this time conversant with the life of Christ and the wanderings of the children of Israel. Chinese literature is almost entirely composed of two branches — obscure hair-splitting essays on the meaning of words, and very improper novels. The Chinese, therefore, delight in the freshness and simplicity of

the Bible narratives. I have talked with many Chinamen who would as soon think of becoming fishes as Christians, who knew these narratives by heart and believed every word of them. The doctrines meet their approval as a rule. In an interesting conversation I had with the chief priest of the sacred island of Pootoo (the Pontifex Maximus of about two thousand priests and several scores of temples and monasteries), he insisted and argued with great ingenuity that the Christian and Buddhist religions are essentially the same. He was quite conversant with the main features of the Christian religion. Bibles are bought everywhere in China with avidity, because the Chinamen find them pleasant reading. Now, it is not a question as to whether the Bible is the best book for the Chinese or not. The question is, Here is a book that the Chinese will buy, and it will help, merely as containing something that is new, to lift them out of the mud in which they have stuck for two thousand years. Here, on the other hand, is a number of respectable men who will undertake to provide them with this book. Failing these men, there is no other agency by which this knowledge will be disseminated. It is the Protestant missionary, or absolute ignorance. Has

this country sunk to such a depth of sordid selfishness as to hesitate in the choice?

Protestant missionaries fill a post in China that can be filled by no other foreigner. They are the only men who translate European books and teach European science in the Chinese language. The merchants do not know the Chinese language. British officials, when they do know the language, mix but little with the natives. Protestant missionaries mix with the people, and their wives visit the women. They live with the Chinese on a friendly footing, and are the only foreigners, except the Catholic missionaries, who as a class do so—a very important fact in a country where the people, until they know better, look upon all foreigners as “devils” or “barbarians.”

Every Anglo-Chinese dictionary that has yet been made for the benefit of English students is the work of Protestant missionaries. Nearly a hundred works on science, medicine, history, geography, law, and miscellaneous subjects have been published by them for the benefit of the Chinese. Some of these have been so much esteemed that they have been reprinted by rich Chinamen and added to the permanent literature of the country. The civilisation of the Chinese can only come by

their own language being made the vehicle of their education. Up to the present time missionaries alone have used it for that purpose. If I were asked to devise a plan for the rapid improvement of the Chinese race, it is likely that I should choose a different plan from that of the missionaries; but is that a reason why I should consider their plan as bad, or, worse still, condemn it altogether? Because a railway train goes only at the rate of twenty miles an hour, is that a reason why the rails should be torn up?

There are other branches of knowledge for which we are much indebted to the present staff of Protestant missionaries in China. I will only mention Mr Wylie and the Rev. Mr Williamson of Chefoo, because the one has lately been in this country, and the other is still here; and I leave it to the officers of the Royal Geographical Society to say whether the noble lord who styled the Protestant missionaries, of whom these gentlemen are fair representatives, "racals or enthusiasts," is not bound to apologise, even at this lapse of time, for his unguarded expression.

The class of "medical missionaries," to whose great usefulness I can personally testify, must stand or fall with the others. Medical science does not

exist amongst the Chinese, and the mission hospitals give relief to thousands of suffering people who would otherwise die unsuccoured. I have seen many a life saved by a simple surgical operation, that, unhelped by European skill, would have been lost. It is not difficult to imagine how this must raise the character of foreigners. If this should meet the eye of any one interested in medical missions, I wish it to be known that medical missionaries are much underpaid. I know able men at this moment working for the good of the Chinese, and suffering the hardships of an insufficient income in a country where hardship invariably means sickness. Alongside of them they see the doctor in civil practice amongst Europeans living in ease, and even affluence. It is not to be wondered at if a man, in consideration for his wife and family, should occasionally feel it his duty to leave the mission for more lucrative practice.

I have treated at some length of the mission question, in order that those who take no interest in missions may see that, apart altogether from religious questions, the Chinese people have an immense stake in freedom being given to missionaries. Whoever is interested in civilisation must wish

that they should be protected in the fullest liberty. We have given the Chinese opium, and can never take it from them, as they are now cultivating it over the whole country ; but it is in our power to give them the culture and education by which alone opium abuses can be checked. If nations have consciences, I appeal to that of the English people not to allow a limited and selfish class of oppressors to frighten them into consenting to withdraw from a single province of China the only men who represent there the philanthropy of Christian and civilised countries.

But the interest that most pressingly demands attention is that of the China trade. And it is necessary to pause for a moment, in order to state exactly who are the persons most benefited by the trade. There is a popular mistake that it is the merchant in China that has been benefited. Some individuals of course have, but the real benefit has been almost entirely received by the consumers and producers in England and China. The middle person between the two has his alternate profits and losses, but the drinkers of tea in England, and the buyers of Manchester cottons and Bradford woollens in China, enjoy an uninterrupted good. In the mean time the merchants

in China are justly alarmed for their lives, and their claim upon their Government for being placed in a safer position for the future rests upon its good faith in compelling the faithful execution of its own treaties. The question now, as it concerns them, is much less what is to be the punishment of the Tientsin murderers, than what measures on the part of our Government will prevent future murders.

There is another fallacy which I am astonished to find imposes upon even intelligent people in this country. It is alleged that trade has been forced upon the Chinese. Now it is quite impossible to force a trade. Trade supposes a buyer and a seller, and unless the buyer is as willing to buy as the seller is to sell, trade will not exist. The China trade has been produced by a great willingness on the part of the Chinese both to buy and sell. The mandarins, who fear the loss of their plunder, have always put obstacles in the way of the buyers and sellers; and all China trade has been, as far as they were concerned, forced. But it is only by confusing the mandarins who do not buy and sell with the people who do that such an idea as a forced trade in China could ever have arisen.

As it is almost certain that the outrages against foreigners are originated by a few unprincipled mandarins in order to further their own selfish purposes; and as the defeat of these men will entail specific action by the Government at home, it is worth while examining what the China trade is worth.

I will pass over altogether the silk and tea trade, although the latter gives the British Government a revenue of three millions sterling, and puts half a million more in the pockets of British ship-owners, and will confine myself to noting the features of the export trade from Great Britain to China. I confine myself to it because this is a branch of trade whose development depends upon the action of foreign Powers. Large as it is, it is still in its infancy.

To make myself intelligible, I must crave the attention of the reader to the following figures: In 1840 the value of exports from England to China was £524,198. Then came the first China war and the opening of new ports, the consequence of which was that in 1844 the value was £2,305,617. This was overtrading at the time. Trade soon found its level, and from 1847 to 1850 inclusive we find an annual average of £1,500,000.

The gain to the export trade by the opening of the new ports was £1,000,000. There was little increase possible without more ports being opened. But the war of 1858-60 secured the opening of more ports and the navigation of part of the Yangtse. The result was that the annual average for 1865-69 was £6,574,400, an excess over that of 1858 of £3,697,953. The second war brought thus an annual gain to trade of three and a half millions. An analysis of the £8,000,000 paid by China to England for manufactured goods in 1869 shows that of that sum £2,500,000 was retained in England and paid as wages to spinners, weavers, packers, shippers, carriers, and others. The other five millions were sent to other countries, chiefly the United States, to pay for the raw material. But it is evident that there must have been a corresponding gain to the Chinese purchasers, who must have equally benefited by the wars which their Government provoked. So much for the value to England of the trade which is now threatened.

But I cannot leave this subject without adding a few words about the great stake that England has in the deliverance of the Chinese from the oppression of their rulers. England can only be great in proportion as her manufactures thrive.

She is pre-eminently the manufacturing country of the world. In China we have a population of three hundred millions of people ready to buy her manufactures. Preventing the purchase are a few thousand unprincipled and ignorant men, who are blind to any interest but their own. They hamper by vexatious taxation all foreign goods as soon as they leave the ports, and, what is more effectual, they forbid steam-navigation on their large and rapid rivers. They forbid the working of coal by foreign machinery, and so make the steamers on the coast more expensive for the trade of their own people. The thirty millions of people in the rich province of Szechuen are equally shut out from us with the starving and plundered millions in the west and north. Now I wish the manufacturers of England and their workmen to weigh well what follows. I hear that distress is sometimes produced in this country by mills being put on half-time. If the British Government espouse the 'cause of the Chinese people, who are too oppressed and ignorant to express a wish of their own, against the mandarins, there would be a consumption of cotton and woollen manufactured cloths in China that would keep every mill in England going night and day for years to come.

To obtain this it is necessary to obtain free right of travel and residence, and permission to use steam on the land and water. The capital would be subscribed by the Chinamen who have already become rich by foreign trade at the ports.*

A desire on the part of our representatives to bolster up the falling dynasty, that scarcely even professes to govern in many parts of the empire, is the chief obstacle towards the emancipation of China. It is time that the people of this country awoke to the fact of how much their own interests suffer by the support that is given to the Tartar family at Peking, and a few of its adherents. Now that it is almost certain that direct interference must take place, regardless of the Emperor's prerogative, it would be well to extend that interference to the opening up the whole country. There would be no violation of the sovereign rights of States in this interference, because China as a sovereign and independent State does not now exist. A large tract of country constantly overrun with rebellions, in which there is no fixed

* In this connection I call attention to an extract from the report of Messrs Michie & Francis to the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, which I print as an Appendix.

order, and which is unable to answer for the safety of persons resident within its limits, ought not to be assumed to have the rights of a sovereign and independent State. The present governors of China are as unable as they are unwilling to act towards us in the good faith with which one Government treats another with which it is on equal terms. Our whole conduct towards them, even during the last ten years, in spite of our professions to the contrary, is on the assumption that they are neither equal nor civilised. Why then allow the figment of a theory, which it is impossible to carry out, to stand in the way of applying the ordinary principles of common-sense in dealing with the Chinese? I am no advocate for recklessly going to war with China, and I deplore such acts of Vandalism as the destroying of the Summer Palace, and the scattering for ever the antiquities collected for more than a thousand years—a destruction which involves a loss to the history of the human race; but, thanks to the feeble diplomacy of the past, we are now in a position in which whether we fight or not will depend on whether we are opposed, and in which there is no choice but to assert ourselves all over China as being stronger and as ready to use our strength.

If Englishmen in China—either the paid servants of the Chinese Government, or the few men who from long association with the mandarins have come to look upon their interests as supreme—advise our Government to mild or half measures, then I warn the lovers of peace that our future intercourse with China will be marked by a succession of wars, each of which will be bloodier and more difficult than the previous one. The policy I advocate will enrich the manufacturing classes of England; but it is not on their behalf I feel so strongly. I write on behalf of the starving wretches I have met on the inland waters of China, old men and young children huddled in narrow boats, flying in thousands from the famine and death that floods and robbers had brought on millions who would have been happier under the most despotic government that ever existed. In such circumstances I have often realised how much worse no government is than a bad government; and when I have read in English newspapers fears of Russian aggression in China, I have felt that if the writers had any idea of the misery from which Russian despotism would save the Chinese people, they would in the interests of humanity urge the Czar to extend his sway to

India and Cochin China on the south, and the Pacific on the east.

But surely England will not allow other Governments to be the first to save China. Her interests far exceed those of all the other Powers put together. More, her subjects fifty years ago introduced into China the extensive use of a drug which, after much observation and a study of what has been said both for and against it, I believe to be a great evil to the nation, an evil which nothing now will uproot but education and knowledge. Surely this wrong entitles us to do something to relieve the evils of that unhappy people. I have unlimited confidence in the natural ability of the Chinese race if a helping hand is given them to make the first move. The only way to give effectually a helping hand is to give them a Government whose interests will be those of the people.

APPENDIX.

*Quotation from Messrs Michie & Francis's Report to
the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, July 1869.*

MUCH stress has justly been laid on the obstructions opposed to trade by the exactions of the mandarins. But that is only one obstacle to the circulation of foreign goods in China. A greater one is the passive and unconscious resistance of a people of stagnant ideas, of very limited enterprise, and possessing only primitive means of intercommunication. They will not advance towards foreigners to seek their trade until foreigners have pressed it on them. They will never themselves improve their means of transport, nor develop new wants, like progressive nations. Foreigners must provide the means of bringing different parts of the empire into close communication, and they must also to a certain extent create the wants which they wish to supply, by offering their goods and "introducing" them to their customers. Commerce everywhere requires to be energetically "pushed" to be successful; and this is

peculiarly true of the trade in foreign manufactures in China. When new ports are opened new depots are established, whence new markets can be easily reached, and new circles of customers made acquainted with foreign commodities. When swift steamers are placed on great water-routes, the native merchants can and do make as many voyages and transact as much business in a year as they formerly did in a decade. This stimulates the flow of foreign manufactures to the consuming localities in the interior. Though the Chinese are of themselves incapable of originating any such improvement, they are very ready to avail themselves of it when provided for them. But the spirit of enterprise is all on the side of foreigners, and the onus of every forward movement in commerce must necessarily rest on them. It is much to be regretted that hitherto each stage of commercial progress in China has been attained at the cost of a war. The permission to supply the vast trading population with steam transport along their three thousand miles of coast, and the reopening of the main artery of the country, the river Yangtse, which had been closed for eight years by the Taiping rebels, although the latter was the only means by which the authority of the Emperor could be restored in the heart of the country, were only obtained from the Imperial Government by force of arms. And this is the strange anomaly of foreign relations with China, which is even now so imperfectly appreciated by persons out of China, that the measures which have suppressed brigandage in some of the most important provinces of the country, turned deserted ruins into flourishing cities,

imparted a new life to native trade all over the empire; which have actually saved the Imperial Government itself from destruction, and the country from anarchy, have all been assented to as *concessions to foreigners*. On the one side there has been, and still is, the whole mass of the people patiently desiring extended intercourse with foreigners and increased facilities for trade; on the other side there is the mandarin interest all over the empire opposed to any movement that might affect their power of private and irresponsible taxation, whose resistance to the wishes of the people and of foreigners has only been overcome on occasions when a war, undertaken for a different object, afforded an opportunity to foreign Powers to dictate conditions.

Regarding the matter from a purely economic point of view, the English people, at all events, have been clear gainers by their wars in China. The last one cost the country £6,000,000, the greater part of which was distinctly caused by the inexcusable blunder of abandoning the right of residence in Peking after it had been provided for in the treaty of 1858. The indemnity exacted from the Chinese Government was of course a mere percentage on the amount; but one of the results of the war has been a gain of the actual excess in the value of the trade in direct British exports which has followed it over that previously existing, which amounts to the aggregate of £23,442,000 since 1858; England's share of which—that is, the one-third that remains as absolute profit to the country—is £8,000,000, to set off against the £6,000,000 expended on the war.

We only allude to this view of the question to show

that even mere economists have hitherto had no cause to regret progress in China. But in a matter where the benefits to all the parties concerned are so susceptible of demonstration, and where the only opponents of advancement are a small minority of the Chinese people who happen to be personally interested in perpetuating a destructive system of administration, it is to be hoped that the rights and interests of the industrious millions may not always be sacrificed to the obstructive devices of their unscrupulous oppressors; for the obstructive attitude of the "Chinese Government" is only intelligible on the hypothesis that the duties and responsibilities of a government are not accepted by them, that their only function is to live on the people, and their only care to enrich themselves individually at whatever cost to the prospects of the wealth-producing classes. How to extend beneficent, in other words, commercial measures in China, without the cumbrous and wholly unnecessary intervention of war with the despotic class, is a problem which need not baffle the philanthropic statesmen of the nineteenth century, if their philanthropy be guided by an intelligent interpretation of facts.

THE END.

NEW BOOKS.

HORACE: **HIS LIFE AND WORKS.**

By THEODORE MARTIN.

Being Vol. VI.

ANCIENT CLASSICS FOR ENGLISH READERS.

Edited by the Rev. W. LUCAS COLLINS, M.A.

In crown 8vo, price 2s. 6d.

JOHN: A LOVE STORY.

By MRS OLIPHANT,
Author of 'Chronicles of Carlingford,' &c.

Two Volumes, crown 8vo, 2ls.

A NEW SEA AND AN OLD LAND:

BEING PAPERS SUGGESTED BY A VISIT TO EGYPT AT
THE END OF 1869.

Originally published in 'Blackwood's Magazine.'

By W. G. HAMLEY,
Colonel in the Corps of Royal Engineers.

In crown 8vo, with Illustrations. [In the Press.]

THE METAMORPHOSES **OF** **PUBLIUS OVIDIUS NASO.**

TRANSLATED IN ENGLISH BLANK VERSE.

By HENRY KING, M.A.
Fellow of Wadham College, Oxford, and of the Inner Temple,
Barrister-at-Law.

[In the Press.]

NEW BOOKS—Continued.

THE PARADISE OF BIRDS.

AN OLD **EXTRAVAGANZA** IN A MODERN DRESS.

By W. J. COURTHOPE.

[In the Press.]

A New Edition, being the Third, price 6s.

GEOLOGY FOR GENERAL READERS.

A SERIES OF POPULAR SKETCHES IN GEOLOGY AND
PALÆONTOLOGY.

By DAVID PAGE, LL.D. F.R.S.E. F.G.S.

A New Edition.

THE BOOK OF THE FARM.

By HENRY STEPHENS, F.R.S.E.

Almost entirely Rewritten, and brought up to the Present State of the Practice and Science of Agriculture. With numerous Engravings. To be published in Ten Monthly Parts, at 5s. each. Three Parts are now published.

**INTRODUCTORY TEXT-BOOK
OF
METEOROLOGY.**

FOR THE USE OF SCHOOLS AND PRIVATE STUDENTS.

By ALEXANDER BUCHAN, M.A. F.R.S.E.
Secretary of the Scottish Meteorological Society, Author of
'Handy Book of Meteorology.'

With Charts and other Illustrations.

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD & SONS, Edinburgh and London.





